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1 Introduction
The New Keynesian (NK) model has gained widespread use both in academic research and in
policy circles. The crux of the model is that nominal frictions induce ine¢ cient uctuations
in the economy that monetary and scal policies can be designed to address. Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) provide a summary of the models key insights, based on a highly intuitive,
three-equation version. Paradoxically, however, these insights do not pertain to unemployment
and distributional issues, two central aspects of many policy discussions.
Recently, a new generation of NK models that addresses these deciencies has emerged. For
example, Gertler and Trigari (2009), Blanchard and Galí (2010), Ravenna and Walsh (2011),
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2016) introduce unemployment by incorporating
Search and Matching (SAM) frictions in the labor market. Others have introduced nancial
market incompleteness, generating inequality in income, wealth and consumption. Kaplan, Moll
and Violante (2016) have dubbed such models Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian (HANK)
models.1 By giving centre stage to HANK and SAM, the new models mark a clear break with the
traditional representative agentassumption, o¤er a rich array of cross-sectional predictions,
and allow inequality across households to matter in models of aggregate uctuations.
This paper complements the new vintage of NK models with an analytically tractable coun-
terpart that is as simple as the model in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), but nonetheless features
search and matching frictions in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides tradition, and incomplete
markets à la Bewley, Huggett and Aiyagari. Our main purpose is to revisit core qualitative
results highlighted in the New Keynesian literature and to understand how these results are
a¤ected by the interactions between HANK and SAM. We demonstrate profound implications
for equilibrium determinacy, the long run equilibrium properties and selection, the response of
the economy to shocks, the implications of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest
rate, and the determination of asset prices.
The models tractability derives from a special assumption on householdsborrowing limit,
see also Krusell, Smith and Mukoyama (2009), Ravn and Sterk (2012) and Werning (2015).2 The
1Papers in this new vein include Auclert (2015), Bayer, Pham-Dao, Luetticke and Tjaden (2015), Beaudry,
Galizia and Portier (2014), Berger, Dew-Becker, Schmidt and Takahasi (2016), Challe, Matheron, Ragot and
Rubio-Ramirez (2016), den Haan, Rendahl and Riegler (2016), Heathcote and Perri (2015), Gornemann, Kuester
and Nakajima (2016), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2016), Kekre (2016), Luetticke (2015), McKay, Nakamura and
Steinsson (2016), McKay and Reis (2016a,b), and Ravn and Sterk (2012).
2Krusell, Smith and Mukoyama (2009) study asset pricing in an endowment economy without nominal rigidi-
ties. Werning (2015) derives an aggregate Euler equation under incomplete markets, but does not explicitly
model nominal rigidities or search and matching frictions. Ravn and Sterk (2012) study labor market shocks
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assumption gives rise to an equilibrium with three groups of households: borrowing-constrained
unemployed households, unconstrained but asset-poor employed households, and asset-rich but
liquidity-constrained households.3,4 This assumption, which limits but not eliminates household
heterogeneity, allows us to address two limitations of the new generation of NK models. First,
they generally require numerical methods along the lines of Krusell and Smith (1998), which
makes it hard to understand the economic mechanisms in a clear fashion. Second, a serious
issue is the possible emergence of equilibrium multiplicity which may be overlooked in numerical
procedures. This possibility is not a mere technical artefact as uctuations driven by animal
spiritscan arise naturally under incomplete markets and endogenous employment risk.5
We demonstrate that the equilibrium outcomes are shaped by the interaction between two
endogenous wedges. The rst is a standard sticky-price wedge in the labor demand equation
(also called the NK Phillips Curve). The second wedge appears in the Euler equation, and
results from nancial market incompleteness. Werning (2015) highlights the emergence of this
wedge in an analytically aggregated Euler equation, but does not model explicitly how the
wedge is determined in equilibrium. We demonstrate how the incomplete markets wedge, in a
model with search and matching frictions, is pinned down as a function of tightness of the labor
market, how it interacts with the sticky-price wedge, and how it is a¤ected by policy. This labor
market wedge produces endogenous unemployment risk which feeds back though price setting
and savings decisions to produce a powerful amplication mechanism. We also provide a micro-
foundation for exogenous discount factor shocks that are often introduced in NK models, either
to better t the data (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) or to drive down the interest rate to a
point at which the ZLB becomes binding (see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2013).
We present six sets of results. The rst concerns the steady-state properties of the model.
As in the basic NK model there is an intendedsteady state as well as an unintended liquidity
using numerical simulations.
3See Kaplan, Violante and Weidner (2014) for empirical evidence on the asset distribution across households,
emphasizing the empirical importance of households with large wealth but few liquid assets. In our model, the
wealthy households endogenously face a low degree of consumption risk, which weakens their desire to accumulate
bonds for precautionary reasons, relative to the poor households. As a result, the wealthy households are unwilling
to invest in bonds at prevailing market interest rates, causing them to be liquidity-constrained in equilibrium.
4Like Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), we abstract from physical capital for reasons of tractability. Our
model, however, does have a form of investment, namely investment in vacancies. In an extension of the model
with capital, the precautionary savings e¤ects would create only weak spillovers, or no spillovers at all, to capital
investment, for the precise same reason that in the present model these e¤ects do not spill over to vacancy
investment: the owners of the rms are rich, which shields them from idiosyncratic risk.
5Intuitively, a wave of pessimism among households about their employment prospects could be self-fullling
as the increased desire to build precautionary savings reduces aggregate demand, causing rms to hire fewer
workers when prices are sticky and stabilization policy is insu¢ ciently responsive.
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trap. In the latter steady state, the ZLB binds and output is relatively low, as in Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001, 2002). Unlike the standard NK model, however, our model may
have a third steady state, which we label the unemployment trap, in which aggregate demand
is depressed to a level at which it is no longer protable for rms to invest in vacancies, and
in which ination is moderately smaller than in the intended steady-state. In this equilibrium,
hiring declines to a minimum, which perpetuates high job uncertainty and hence low demand.6
Next, we study local determinacy properties, exploring the scope for belief-driven dynamics
around steady states. We rst present an analytical determinacy condition for the intended
steady state. We show that local indeterminacy can arise even when the Taylor Principle
is satised (i.e. when the interest rate rule coe¢ cient on ination is larger than one, see e.g.
Woodford, 2003, Chapter 2). This result derives from the presence of the endogenous incomplete
markets wedge, and depends crucially on its interaction with the sticky-price wedge. Addition-
ally, we show that the unemployment trap is determinate under a standard rule which responds
more than one-for-one to ination. Around this steady state, the monetary policy rule deter-
mines the rate of ination, but has no grip on unemployment.
Our third set of results concerns the responses to fundamental and non-fundamental shocks.
We present an analytical formula for the local response to a productivity shock around the
intended steady state and show that the presence of incomplete markets can create signicant
amplication, see also Ravn and Sterk (2012) for numerical results. When the steady state is
locally indeterminate, pessimistic belief shocks generate joint declines in employment, ination
and the real interest rate. The persistence of the e¤ects is endogenously determined, and is
maximized at degrees of price stickiness and market incompleteness that are just strong enough
to generate local indeterminacy, but are otherwise relatively moderate.
Fourth, we revisit the role of the ZLB. We show that, due to the interaction sticky prices and
incomplete markets and in contrast to representative-agent NK models, a negative productivity
shock may bring the nominal interest rate to the ZLB. Further we show that ZLB episodes are
not necessarily deationary under incomplete markets. This happens as the real interest rate
declines when unemployment increases, due to a heightened demand for precautionary savings.
At the ZLB, a decline in the real interest rate implies an increase in ination via the Fisher
relation.
Additionally, we revisit paradoxesthat arise in the representative-agent NK model when
6Kaplan and Menzio (2016) and Schaal and Taschereau-Duchoumel (2016) analyze multiplicity of equilibria
and steady states in models with unemployment and demand externalities, but abstract from sticky prices and
precautionary savings e¤ects.
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the ZLB binds, see e.g. Eggertsson (2010), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Werning (2012).
Specically, we show that the precautionary savings mechanism in our model can overturn the
paradox that, at the ZLB, positive productivity shocks may be contractionary, as well as the
paradox that greater price exibility may lead to larger drops in output. Both paradoxes arise
from the fact that, at the ZLB, a transitory decline in ination increases the real interest rate
temporarily. In a representative agent model, this can only be consistent with a macroeconomic
contraction, reducing household consumption and hence weakening the desire to save. With
incomplete markets, however, an increase in the real rate can be consistent with a macroeconomic
expansion, since the desire to build precautionary savings is dampened as the economy expands.
Fifth, we study the determination of risk premia. There is little existing research on this
topic within the context of the NK model, since under complete markets the model does not
generate rst-order risk premia. At the same time, monetary policy is widely believed to have
a large impact on nancial markets. We show that under incomplete markets, the NK model
can generate substantial risk premia and we provide an analytical formula for their magnitudes.
The formula reveals a close connection between risk premia, the business cycle, and monetary
policy. This results from the fact that idiosyncratic unemployment risk co-moves negatively with
aggregate demand, causing households to dislike risky assets which pay o¤ relatively little after
an adverse shock hits the macro economy. Monetary policy has a dual e¤ect on risk premia,
since more stable uctuations in aggregate demand reduce both uctuations in asset payo¤s and
uctuations in householdsstochastic discount factors.
Finally, we propose a simple way to confront the model with the data. Clearly, the purpose
of our study is qualitative in nature rather than quantitative. Nonetheless, it turns out that the
model has a key prediction that can be checked directly in the data, which distinguishes the
model from a representative-agent counterpart. Specically, our model predicts that the real
interest rate declines during times when the labor market becomes less tight, which increases
unemployment risk and strengthens the precautionary savings motive. Under complete markets,
the real interest rate increases when tightness of the labor market weakens, as income declines
temporarily, encouraging households to save less. We show that in the data, there is a strik-
ing, positive co-movement between the real interest rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio,
providing direct support for the precautionary savings mechanism. Further, we show how the
observed variances of the real interest rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio can be used
to discipline the values of the model parameters controlling the strength of the precautionary
savings e¤ects.
4
2 The Model
We construct a model which combines nominal rigidities in price setting as in the NK tradi-
tion, labor market matching frictions in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tradition,
and incomplete asset markets in the Aiyagari-Bewley tradition. The economy is made up of
households who consume and work, rms which produce output, and a monetary authority in
charge of the nominal interest rate. We allow for both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty
and assume lack of household insurance against idiosyncratic income risk.
2.1 Preferences and Technologies
Preferences: There is a continuum of mass 1 of innitely lived single-member households
indexed by i 2 (0; 1). Households consume goods, ci;s, have disutility of work and maximize the
expected discounted present value of their utility streams:
Vi;t = Et
1X
s=t
s t
 
c1 i;s   1
1     ni;s
!
; (1)
where Etxs = E (xsjIt) is the date t conditional expectation of xs,  2 (0; 1) the subjective
discount factor,  > 0 the measure of relative risk aversion, ni;s the households employment
status, and  > 0 is a parameter that measures the disutility of market work. An individual
household is either employed and works full-time or does not work at all:
ni;s =
8<: 0 if not employed at date s1 if employed at date s : (2)
The consumption level of an individual household is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggre-
gator of a basket of consumption goods, cji :
ci;s =
Z
j
 
cji;s
1 1=
dj
1=(1 1=)
; (3)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties. Workers who are not
employed produce # units of the aggregate consumption good at home.
Households decide on consumption, savings, on the nancial portfolio, and on whether or
not to participate in the labor force. A household not in the labor force cannot search for jobs
in the market. Households who stand to lose on the net from employment declare themselves
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out of the labor force. We discuss the savings and portfolio problems later.
Production technology: Market goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive rms, indexed by j 2 (0;M) ; that each supply a di¤erentiated good. The technology
is:
yj;s = exp (As)nj;s; (4)
where yj;s is rms js output and nj;s its employment. As is an aggregate stochastic productivity
shock which follows a rst-order autoregressive process:
As = As 1 + A"As ; (5)
where  2 ( 1; 1), A > 0 and "As  N (0; 1).
The law of motion of employment of rm j is:
nj;s = (1  !)nj;s 1 + hj;s; (6)
where ! is a constant employment separation rate and hj;s denotes hiring by rm j. Firms hire
workers by posting and ll each posted job vacancy with probability qs. We take rms to be
su¢ ciently large that qs is also the fraction of vacancies that are lled.7 Thus, the total number
of vacancies posted by rm j is given by hj;s=qs.
Matching technology: Agents receive information about current productivity shocks at the
beginning of each period. Existing worker-rm relationships are resolved at the end of the period
and new ones are formed at the beginning of the next period. Job separations are exogenous
and a¤ect existing hires randomly so that employees perceive ! to be the risk that they lose
their current job.
New hires are produced by a matching function which relates the measure of newly formed
worker-rm matches to the aggregate measures of vacancies, vs, and job searchers, es, as:
M(es; vs) =  e

s v
1 
s ; (7)
where  > 0 indicates match e¢ ciency,  2 (0; 1), and vs =
R
j
(vj;s + ev) dj is the aggregate
measure of vacancies. Here, vj;s denotes the number of formalvacancies posted by rm j, which
7This is useful because we will later assume symmetry across rms and the large rm assumption avoids
having to consider that the number of vacancies lled are stochastic.
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come at a ow cost  > 0 per unit. Further, ev  0 is a xed amount of informalvacancies,
available to each rm, which come at no cost. The idea behind the latter type of vacancies
is that even without devoting any resources to recruitment, rms would be able to hire some
workers via word-of-mouth channels. The idea that not all hiring requires costly investments
on the rm side is in line with empirical ndings of Davis, Haltiwanger and Faberman (2013),
who report that a substantial fraction of hiring takes place at establishments with no reported
vacancies.8
The job lling probability, qs, and the job nding rate, s, i.e. the probability that a jobless
worker nds a new employer, depend on market tightness, s  vses , as:
qs =
M(es; vs)
vs
=   s ; (8)
s =
M(es; vs)
es
=  1 s ; (9)
Note that the job lling rate and the job nding rate are related as qs =  
1
1 

 1
s . It turns
out that  and  enter the model equations in a way that is observationally equivalent for our
purpose. Hence we normalize  to one from now on.
2.2 Price and Wage Setting
Prices: Firms set prices of their products, Pj;s, subject to a quadratic price adjustment cost as
in Rotemberg (1982). The extent of nominal rigidities in price setting is parameterized by   0
which determines the size of the price adjustment costs. Let ws denote the average real wage, ys
aggregate output, and Ps be the aggregate price level. We anticipate that in equilibrium wages
are the same for all workers and hence exclude worker- and rm specic indices for the wage.
Firms maximize:
Et
1X
s=t
j;t;t+s
"
Pj;s
Ps
yj;s   wsnj;s   vj;s   
2

Pj;s   Pj;s 1
Pj;s 1
2
ys
#
; (10)
8In much of the analysis, the informal vacancies play no role since in most equilibria new workers are at the
marginhired via costly vacancies. However, we will show that there may also be equilibria in which rms are
unwilling to invest any resources in vacancies. In those cases, the informal vacancies become relevant as they
avoid a complete collapse of employment.
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subject to (6) as well as to a demand constraint which derives from the consumersdecision
problems:
yj;s =

Pj;s
Ps
 
ys; (11)
where ys =
R
j
yj;sdj denotes aggregate output and j;t;t+s is the discount factor of the rms own-
ers (discussed below). We also impose that investment in formal vacancies cannot be negative,
i.e.
vj;s  0: (12)
Real marginal costs is the sum of the wage and hiring costs of a marginal worker (relative to
productivity). To hire a marginal additional worker at date s, rms must spend =qs but since
matches persist, hiring today brings about future hiring cost savings (1  !)=qs (discounted at
the appropriate rate). Real marginal costs are therefore:
mcj;s =
ws
exp(As)
+

qs
  v;j;s   (1  !)Esj;s;s+1


qs+1
  v;j;s+1

; (13)
where v;j;s  0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on Equation (12), which satises the complemen-
tary slackness condition v;j;svj;s = 0. Exploiting symmetry across rms, marginal costs equalize
across rms and hence we drop the rm subscript from now on. The rmsprice-setting problems
deliver the following rst-order condition:9
1   + mcs =  (s   1)s   Ess;s+1

ys+1
ys
(s+1   1)s+1

: (14)
Wages: Because of the matching friction, worker-rm matches produce surpluses which need
to be divided between rms and workers. We assume that real wages are determined by Nash
bargaining between workers and rms. As discussed by Krusell, Mukoyama and Sahin (2010), -
nancial market incompleteness and risk aversion jointly imply that the surpluses that households
derive from employment generally depend on their wealth levels. Hence we label the households
value and surplus functions by i: Firms are symmetric and hence we do not include a rm index
9Note that in the absence of price rigidities and search and matching frictions, the marginal cost equals
mcs =
ws
exp(As)
=  1 : To avoid trivial equilibria in which market work can generate no surplus to workers,
even without labor market and price setting frictions, we assume that #
1  1
1  +  <
(  1 exp(As))
1  1
1  . Strictly
speaking, this requires a bound on the support of the stochastic productivity process.
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in the bargaining equations. The wage solves the following maximization problem:
max
 
Sei;s
  
Sfs
1 
; (15)
where Sei;s is the workers surplus, S
f
s is the rms surplus and  2 (0; 1) is the workers bargaining
weight. We assume that were negotiations to fall through, the worker becomes unemployed while
the rm can attempt to hire a new worker in the same period. The employed workers surplus
(Sei;s), the di¤erence between the value of being employed (V
e
i;s) and unemployed (V
u
i;s), is then:
Sei;s = V
e
i;s   V ui;s;
V ei;s =
c1 i;e;s
1      + Es!
 
1  s+1

V ui;s+1 + Es
 
1  !  1  s+1V ei;s+1;
V ui;s =
c1 i;u;s
1   + Es
 
1  s+1

V ui;s+1 + Ess+1V ei;s+1;
where ci;e;s (ci;u;s) is the consumption level optimally chosen by the household in case of employ-
ment (unemployment). Recall that separations take place at the very end of the period whereas
new matches are formed at the very beginning. Accordingly, the term !
 
1  s+1

in the second
equation is the probability that an employed worker in period s is still employed in period s+1,
either because the current match remains in tact, or because the current breaks down but the
worker immediately nds a new job in the beginning of the next period.
Since the rm will post vacancies to hire a replacement worker should the current negotiations
fail, the surplus of the match to the rm satises:
Sfs =

qs
: (16)
2.3 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority follows an interest rate rule. Specically, the interest rate responds
to ination, given by s  PsPs 1 , and to labor market tightness. The latter variable naturally
captures, inversely, the degree of labor market slack. The interest rate rule is given by:
Rs = max
(
R

s

 s


; 1
)
; (17)
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where R; ; ;   0 and   0 are policy parameters and the max operator captures the zero
lower bound on the net nominal interest rate, Rs   1.
2.4 Financial Markets
In NK models with unemployment it is typically assumed that individual households are in-
sured against idiosyncratic earnings shocks within large diversied families or, alternatively, that
households can purchase unemployment insurance contracts at actuarially fair prices. Whilst
this conveniently allows one to use a representative agent framework, it also has the unfortunate
consequence that individualsconsumption streams do not depend on their idiosyncratic earn-
ings shocks - including those related to unemployment - which raises questions on the empirical
relevance of the model.
Here we instead assume that households live in single-member families and cannot purchase
unemployment insurance contracts, c.f. Challe and Ragot (2016) and Ravn and Sterk (2012).
Households can attempt to self-insure against job uncertainty through savings in a zero-dividend
one-period nominal bond purchased at price 1=Rs units of currency at date s. Let the households
purchases of bonds at date s be given by bi;s. Households must observe a liquidity constraint:
bi;s  b: (18)
A second asset that is available to households is rm equity. In Section 5 we discuss asset
pricing implications and introduce additional risky and riskless assets.
2.5 Conditions for a Tractable Equilibrium
Without further assumptions, the model above can only be solved numerically. In this paper we
aim at an analytical characterization of the equilibrium. It turns out that this can be attained
by imposing two assumptions. First, we impose the following borrowing constraint:
b = 0; (19)
see also see also Krusell, Smith and Mukoyama (2009), Ravn and Sterk (2012) and Werning
(2015). Second, we assume limited participation in the market for rm ownership. Specically,
only a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the households has the ability to invest in rm equity.
To appreciate why the model now simplies very considerably, consider rst the households
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who cannot invest in rm equity (i  ). Amongst these households, employed workers have
an incentive to save while unemployed workers have an incentive to dissave or borrow. The
borrowing constraint above, however, implies that households cannot borrow and therefore there
is no supply of bonds. In equilibrium, these households are therefore unable to accumulate any
savings. We therefore refer to the households who cannot invest in rm equity as the asset
poor. In the absence of savings, they consume their current incomes, i.e.
ci;e;s = ws;
ci;u;s = #:
Next, consider the households who can invest in rm equity (i < ), who end up being
asset rich as they receive the monopoly prots of the rm. These households will typically
receive higher levels of income than those who are unable to invest in equity, and therefore
may be unwilling to work depending on the level of the disutility parameter  and the fraction
of households that can invest (which determines the amount of prots per household). For
simplicity we will assume that parameter values are such that investing households declare
themselves out of the labor force, but this is not important for the key results. The consumption
levels of the asset-rich, ci<;s, equalizes across all agents i 2 (0; ) ; and is given by:
ci<;u;s = #+
1


ys   vs   wsns   
2
(s   1)2 ys

:
It follows that rms discount prots at a common rate t;t+s =  (ci<;u;t=ci<;u;t+s)
 :
All workers (asset-poor households) have the same wealth (zero) and therefore bargain the
same wage because their outside options are identical. Similarly, all investors (asset-rich house-
holds) consume the same amounts. Since there is no heterogeneity across households conditional
on their type and employment status, we drop the i-subscript and denote consumption levels as
ce;s = ci;e;s, cu;s = ci;u;s; and cr;s = ci<;u;s, where subscript r denotes the asset-rich house-
holds. The rst-order condition for bonds delivers the following Euler equations for the three
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types of households:
c e;s = Es
Rs
s+1
 
!
 
1  s+1

c u;s+1 +
 
1  !  1  s+1 c e;s+1+ e;s; (20)
c u;s = Es
Rs
s+1
  
1  s+1

c u;s+1 + s+1c
 
e;s+1

+ u;s; (21)
c r;s = Es
Rs
s+1
c r;s+1 + r;s; (22)
where e;s, u;s, and r;s are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the liquidity constraints of the em-
ployed asset-poor households, the unemployed asset-poor households and the asset-rich house-
holds, respectively.
Since ws > # and ! > 0, the liquidity constraint always binds for the asset-poor unemployed
households, i.e. u;s > 0 at all times. Further, it is straightforward to verify that in any steady
state without aggregate uncertainty it holds that (i) r;s > 0, i.e. the asset rich households
are at the liquidity constraint, and (ii) e;s = 0; i.e. the employed asset-poor households are
not at the liquidity constraint, (iii) and Es Rss+1 < . Intuitively, the asset-rich are not exposed
to idiosyncratic risk and hence are unwilling to take a positive position in bonds, which pay
a real interest rate that lies below their subjective discount rate.10 The employed asset-poor
households, by contrast, are exposed to idiosyncratic risk. This gives rise to a precautionary
savings motive which makes them willing to invest in bonds at a return that is lower than their
subjective discount rate. Therefore, when analyzing steady-state equilibria or in their vicinity,
we can drop Equations (21) and (22), as well the variables u;s, and r;s.
Finally, consider the equilibrium labor market ows. Provided that the asset-poor are un-
willing to leave the labor force, the labor market participation rate is constant and given by
1  : In that case, the aggregate unemployment rate is given by:
us = 1  ns; (23)
where ns = 11 
R
j
nj;sdj is the aggregate employment rate, as a fraction of the labor force. The
law of motion of unemployment is given as
us = us 1 + !ns 1   hs; (24)
10Note that even in scenarios in which the asset-rich would be willing to work, they would still be better insured
against idiosyncratic income risk than the asset-poor households.
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where hs = 11 
R
j
hj;sdj is the number of new hires as a fraction of the labor force. The aggregate
number of job searchers is given by es = (1  ) (us 1 + !ns 1) :
3 Non-stochastic Equilibria
This section discusses the set of equilibria that can arise, absent aggregate shocks. We explore
the nature of the steady-state equilibria that can arise and whether such equilibria are locally
unique in the vicinity of those steady states.
3.1 Global Determinacy
Consider of a version of the model without aggregate productivity shocks (A = 0) and without
potential belief shocks. A crucial di¤erence vis-à-vis the extant complete markets NK literature
is that although the aggregate allocation (and prices) are constant in the steady state, asset-
poor households face idiosyncratic risk in the incomplete markets model due to lack of insurance
against job uncertainty. This has fundamental consequences for the properties of the model,
which we now consider.
We indicate steady-state values by removing time subscripts from variables. Dene for con-
venience R  R   . The solution to the steady-state wage can be expressed as function
of the job nding rate, w (). This function is derived in the Appendix, in which we also discuss
some of its basic properties. Steady-state equilibria can be characterized by the solutions to:
 (1  ) (  1)| {z }
sticky-price wedge
= 1   +   w () +  =(1 )   f (1   (1  !)) ; (PC)
1 = 
maxfR=(1 ); 1g

[! (1  ) (#=w ())  + 1  ! (1  )| {z }]
incomplete-markets wedge
; (EE)
where   e; f  0; and f (   e) = 0: Here, e is the job nding rate that would prevail in a
steady-state in which rms are unwilling to invest in formal vacancies thus only hire via costless
informal channels. In such a steady-state, the job nding rate is given as e = M(e;ev)e , wheree= (1  ) ( !(1 e)
!(1 e)+e (1  !) + !).
Equation (PC) is the steady-state version of (14), the optimality condition for prices in the
symmetric equilibrium (the Phillips Curve), and denes a relationship between ination, ,
13
Figure 1: Illustration of steady-state equilibria.
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and the job nding rate, , provided that  > e. The left-hand side of the equation is a standard
sticky-price wedge which vanishes in the absence of price adjustment costs ( = 0).
Equation (EE) is the steady-state version of the employed householdsEuler equation (20)
which also denes a relationship between  and . The term between square brackets arises due
to incomplete markets, and would collapse to one when either # = w (), i.e. when consumption
is fully insulated against job loss, or when  = 0; i.e. when households are risk neutral. Note
that the wedge is a function of the job nding rate and that the two schedules are non-linear.
Two sources of non-linearity are particularly important in paving the way for multiple steady
states. The rst is the ZLB on the short term nominal interest rate, whereas the second is the
non-negativity constraint on investment in costly vacancies.
Solutions to the above system give the steady-state outcomes for ination and the job nding
rate. Figure 1 illustrates the steady-state schedules. For simplicity, we consider a case in which
the interest rate rule only reacts to ination (i.e.  = 0). There are two EE schedules, one
at which the ZLB binds (EE(R = 1)) and one at which the ZLB does not bind (EE(R > 1)).
The EE(R > 1) implies a positive relation between  and . Intuitively, when the job nding
rate is high, the precautionary savings motive is weak, implying a relatively high real interest
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rate. Since monetary policy responds more than one-for-one to ination, a high real interest rate
implies a high rate of ination. The EE(R = 1), on the other hand, implies a negative relation
between  and , since at the ZLB a high real interest rate implies a low rate of ination. The
PC schedule slopes upward as long as the job nding rate is positive (PC( > e)) but becomes
vertical at the point the job nding rate hits zero and the non-negativity constraint on vacancies
becomes binding (PC( = e)).
Consider rst the left panel of Figure 1, which illustrates a case with incomplete markets and
sticky prices.11 Three possible steady states emerge:12
I Intended steady state. This steady state occurs at the intersection of the PC( > e) and
the EE(R > 1) schedule. This is the intendedsteady state at which the ZLB does not
bind and the job nding rate is relatively high.
II Liquidity trap. This steady state arises because of the ZLB on the nominal interest rate
and occurs at the intersection of the PC( = e) and the EE(R = 1) schedule. This is
the liquidity trap examined by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001, 2002) and
Mertens and Ravn (2013). This steady state features a lower rate of ination than the
intended steady state, as well as a lower job nding rate. In fact, the job nding rate is
zero in the illustration.
III Unemployment trap. This steady state occurs at the intersection of the PC( = e) and
the EE(R > 1) schedule. In this equilibrium, investment in vacancies comes to a complete
standstill despite the fact that the ZLB on the nominal interest rate does not bind. Thus,
any hiring takes place occurs informally. Note that the ination rate in this steady state
lies in between those in the intended steady state and the liquidity trap.13
The rst two of these types of equilibria occur also in standard complete-markets representative-
agent NK models. There are, however, important di¤erences between the properties of the
equilibria under complete and incomplete markets. With full insurance, the steady-state real
interest rate needs to equal 1= in order to be consistent with constant consumption. Without
11The Figure assumes that  = 0, i.e. monetary policy only reacts to ination, and a sticky real wage, i.e.
 = 0.
12We ignore the possibility of an additional equilibrium that occurs due to the quadratic price adjustment
term, or due to non-linearities in w ().
13We have assumed that rms always use the costless informal vacancies, given by ev. Allowing rms to
potentially leave informal vacancies unused, may given rise to an additional steady state.
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full insurance, the wedge in (EE) is positive, which reduces the equilibrium real interest rate
below the inverse of the discount rate, R

< 1

. Intuitively, the consumption loss associated with
job loss creates a precautionary savings motive. Since the net-supply of bonds is zero, the real
interest rate adjusts downward to restore equilibrium.
In the incomplete markets economy, the equilibrium real interest rate depends on the job
nding rate and on the consumption loss that a worker experiences in case of job loss. It there-
fore follows that the equilibrium long run real interest rate depends on economic policy to the
extent that policy choices inuence the job nding rate and/or the consumption loss. Secondly,
whilst the aggregate quantities and prices are constant in the steady states, the combination of
unemployment risk and incomplete markets imply that individual households are subject to idio-
syncratic risk in the steady state in the incomplete markets model. The liquidity trap generated
by the model have very interesting properties which we discuss in detail in Section 5.
The possible emergence of a third steady state depends critically on the interaction between
sticky prices and incomplete markets. The middle and right panels of Figure 1 illustrate, respec-
tively, a case with complete markets (but sticky prices) and a limit case with exible prices (but
incomplete markets). Under complete markets, the EE schedules become horizontal, because
the steady-state real interest rate equals the householdssubjective discount rates. This rule out
a third steady state.14 In the limit case with exible prices, the PC( > e) schedule becomes
vertical, as ination no longer a¤ects rmsmarginal costs. As a result, the PC( = e) sched-
ule vanishes, thus allowing for only two steady states. Thus, without the interaction between
sticky prices and incomplete markets, the third steady state cannot not exist.15 However, in the
presence of both sticky prices and incomplete markets, this steady-state equilibrium outcome
can arise and its likelihood is higher when markets are more incomplete, when monetary policy
reacts little to ination and/or labor market tightness, and hiring costs are limited.
The unemployment trap is an intriguing outcome. The slow recovery after the Great Reces-
sion and the very protracted nature of the surge in unemployment observed in the U.S. (and
many other OECD economies) have spurred a renewed interest in secular stagnation, equi-
librium outcomes consistent with long periods of low activity and high unemployment. Hansen
(1939) argued that such outcomes (with negative natural real interest rates) were most likely
14In the left and middle panel of Figure 1, the liquidity trap does not feature any hiring. For di¤erent parameter
congurations, the liquidity trap can occur at a positive job nding rate. This, however, would rule out the third
steady state.
15Note further that this combination is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the emergence of the third
steady state, since the complete markets version is the limit of the incomplete markets version.
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produced by a combination of low rate of technological progress and population ageing implying
high savings rates and low investment rates. Recently, Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) have
argued that deleveraging may lead to secular stagnation and exacerbate the problems that follow
from an ageing population and falling investment goods prices.
The unemployment trap that can arise in the incomplete markets NK model o¤ers an al-
ternative perspective of secular stagnation which ties together low real interest rates, high un-
employment and low activity. In this steady state, hiring is at a minimum and unemployment
therefore potentially very high. Moreover, because of the low job nding rate, there is a strong
incentive for precautionary savings which drives down the real interest rate. Intriguingly, the
unemployment trap can occur in our model purely because of expectations and thus does not rely
on sudden changes in population growth, technological progress or nancial tightening. Further-
more, while the nominal interest rate may be low in the unemployment trap, its root cause does
not derive from the ZLB on nominal interest rates. Therefore, the ongoing discussions about
the design of monetary policy to deal with the ZLB such as increasing the ination target and
allowing for negative nominal interest rates on central bank deposits may be in vain.
3.2 Local Determinacy
The log-linearized model: We now log-linearize the model in order to study the local stability
properties of the equilibria. Let a hat denotes a log deviation from the intended steady state,
i.e. bxs = ln xs   lnxI ; where xI denotes the value of xs in the intended steady-state (discussed
above). We assume that monetary policy parameters are such that R,  and  correspond to
the levels of, respectively, R;  and , in the intended steady state.
The log-linearized Euler equation of the employed households, (20), can be expressed as (see
the Appendix for details):
 bce;s + REsbce;s+1 = bRs   Esbs+1   REsbs+1| {z }
incomplete-markets wedge
; (25)
  !  (#=w)    1  ! (1  )
bRs   Esbs+1 is the real interest rate while the last term on the right-hand side is the
incomplete-markets wedge, which uctuates proportionally with the expected job nding rate.
Its strength is determined by , a convolution of parameters which consists of two parts. The
rst part, !
 
(#=w)    1 > 0, represents the impact of job loss on the marginal utility of
17
consumption. If home production equals the steady-state wage, i.e. if # = w, or if the house-
hold is risk neutral ( = 0), this part of the wedge collapses to zero. An expected decline in
the job nding rate increases the probability of unemployment and strengthens the households
precautionary savings motive. The second part,  ! (1  ) < 0, derives from the fact that,
under incomplete markets, expected wage growth transmits only partially to expected consump-
tion growth, since the worker may be unemployed in the next period. This part of the wedge
vanishes if wages are fully sticky ( = 0) or when households are risk neutral ( = 0). Note
that when  = 0, the incomplete-markets wedge vanishes and the above equation reduces to the
log-linearized Euler equation obtained in standard representative-agent models.16
Next, we log-linearize the rmsprice-setting condition, Equation (14), around the intended
steady state:


bs   

Esbs+1| {z }
sticky-price wedge
= w ( bws   As)+
q

1  bs  (1  !) q


1  Esbs+1 + bs;s+1   (1  )As

;
(26)
where we have exploited that qs = 
  
1 
s . For now, we abstract from productivity shocks, setting
As = 0 at any date s. The left-hand side of the above equation is the sticky-price wedge, which
vanishes in the absence of price adjustment costs ( = 0) or in the limit with perfect competition
( ! 1). The right-hand side is the log-linearized marginal cost, which is standard given the
presence of search and matching frictions.
The policy rule reads, log-linearized around the intended steady state, reads:
bRs = bs + bs: (27)
In the Appendix, we further show that the log-linearized bargaining equations imply that:
bws = bs; (28)
where  is a convolution of the models deep parameters, which captures the sensitivity of the
wage to uctuations the job nding rate and depends critically on the bargaining parameter .
Finally, note that in equilibrium the employed households consume their wage, i.e. bce;s = bws:
Reducing the model to a single equation: For maximal tractability, we introduce two
16It can be veried that in that case also R = 1.
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further assumptions which allow us to reduce the model to a single equation. First, we set the
monetary policy coe¢ cient equal to  = 1 > 1. This is inconsequential, since the coe¢ cient
on tightness, , is left unrestricted.17 Second, we assume that the households who can invest in
equity (i.e. those with index i < ) are risk neutral. In this case, the log-linearized model has
no endogenous state variables. In the appendix, we relax this assumption. The results suggest
that allowing for risk-averse equity investors has only very limited implications for the model
dynamics.
The log-linearized model can now be reduced just one dynamic equation for the job nding
rate (see the Appendix for a derivation):
Esbs+1 = 	bs (29)
	  
 1 +  1 
1  + w+

q

1 

q
(1 !)
1  + 
 12R+  12R
Under conventional parameter values, both the numerator and the denominator of	 are positive,
and we will proceed under the assumption that this is the case. While the expression for 	 seems
complicated at a rst glance, it turns out to deliver very intuitive results, which we present below.
Determinacy around the intended steady state: rigid real wages: How does the presence
of incomplete markets impact on the possibility of local self-fullling equilibria? Intuitively, an
increase in job uncertainty reduces aggregate demand, which in turn reduces the incentives
to post vacancies. The reduction in vacancies in turn reduces the job nding rate, further
increasing unemployment risk. It is precisely this feedback spiral that opens up the possibility
that exogenous changes in beliefs, or sunspot uctuations , are a source of macroeconomic
uctuations, as the equilibrium is no longer uniquely determined.
The model formalizes the condition under which such uctuations can occur. For simplicity,
we start with a version with sticky wages ( = 0). Since market tightness is not a state variable,
the equilibrium is locally determinate if and only if 	 > 1 , i.e. if and only if:
 1

2R  
1  

<

q

1   (1   (1  !)) :
The above equation makes clear how the occurrence of local indeterminacy depends on ve
types of market frictions present in the model, as well as on monetary policy:
17The log-linearized model contains no endogenous state variables and hence for any desire pair of values 
and  one can nd a value 

 such that the same solution is obtained under the restriction that  =
1
 .
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(i) Price rigidity. If prices are fully exible ( = 0) the equilibrium is always determinate
since the left-hand side collapses to zero and the right-hand side is strictly positive.
(ii) Imperfect competition. Under perfect competition ( ! 1) the equilibrium is always
determinate, for the same reason as above.
(iii) Incomplete markets. Under sticky wages, the incomplete-markets parameter collapses to
 = !
 
(#=w)    1. The case # = w corresponds to full insurance, in which case
the incomplete markets term collapses to zero. In this case, the equilibrium is always
determinate. The same is true when households are risk neutral ( = 0).
(iv) Monetary policy. The more aggressively monetary policy responds to tightness, i.e. the
higher , the less likely indeterminacy is to occur.
(v) Labor adjustment cost. The term 
q

1  (1   (1  !)) denotes the steady-state marginal
cost of hiring a worker today rather than tomorrow, so we can think of it as a labor
adjustment cost, i.e. a real labor rigidity. Note that this cost is proportional to the
steady-state hiring cost 
q
.
There are two main di¤erences between the incomplete markets model and the standard
model with insurance against idiosyncratic risk. The rst is simply that the conditions for
determinacy are more stringent under incomplete markets. With complete markets, a su¢ cient
conditions for local determinacy is that  > 1 as we have assumed (notice that the left hand
side of the inequality is negative when  = 0). Under incomplete markets this is no longer a
su¢ cient condition.
Secondly, there is an important interaction between market incompleteness, sticky prices, and
risk aversion due to the multiplicative nature of the coe¢ cient on the left hand side. Specically,
price rigidities only make indeterminacy more likely if the incomplete markets e¤ect dominates
the monetary policy e¤ect, i.e. if  > . Moreover, less complete nancial markets, i.e.
higher , make indeterminacy more likely, but only if prices are sticky and the goods market
is imperfectly competitive. However, if  > , market incompleteness, nominal rigidities and
risk aversion are complements making local indeterminacy increasingly likely in combination.
An intriguing insights regards the impact of labor market frictions. According to the con-
dition above, the higher is the labor adjustment cost, the less likely it is for indeterminacy to
happen. Thus, less exible labor markets imply less amplication. The reason for this is that
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when it is costly for rms to adjust on the labor margin, they are more likely to adjust prices
which neutralizes the feedback mechanism.
Determinacy around the intended steady state: exible real wages: The determinacy
condition becomes somewhat more involved when we introduce wage exibility ( > 0):
 1

2R  
1  

  w   1  1  R < 
q

1   (1   (1  !)) :
Wage exibility a¤ects determinacy via three channels. First, it does so via an incomplete
markets channel. Recall that   !  (#=w)    1   ! (1  ), so wage exibility reduces
the incomplete markets wedge. Second, wage exibility creates a marginal cost channel, as it
pushes down wage costs during times of low market tightness, pushing up vacancy posting.
This channel comes in via the term  w. Finally, wage exibility generates an intertemporal
substitution channel, as a decline in wages reduces employed householdsincentives to save. This
channel enters via the term   1  1  R. Finally, note that through all three channels
wage exibility pushes the model towards the determinacy region of the parameter space. In
conclusion, real wage exibility is stabilizing in the vicinity of the intended steady-state.
Determinacy around the unemployment trap: We now consider local determinacy around
the unemployment trap. To this end, we exploit that the non-negativity constraint on vacancies
binds. Hence, we can drop Equation (26) and set s equal to e. Thus, the job nding rate is
trivially determined. The Euler equation, log-linearized around the unemployment trap, is given
by:
0 = bs   Esbs+1:
It follows immediately that the equilibrium is unique if and only if  > 1, i.e. the interest rate
elasticity with respect to ination exceeds unity. Thus, the unemployment trap is determinate
under a standard Taylor rule which responds more than one-for-one to ination.
4 Fluctuations
4.1 Local Shocks
Belief shocks: We now explicitly solve for the local dynamics in the vicinity of the intended
steady state in response to shocks. We rst focus on belief shocksstarting with a version of
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the model without productivity shocks. From Equation (29) it follows that if the equilibrium is
locally determinate (	 > 1), then the only stable solution is given by bs = 0 at all times. When
equilibria are locally indeterminate, the solution is given by
bs+1 = 	bs +B"Bs+1;
where "Bs is an i.i.d. belief shock with mean zero and a standard deviation normalized to one,
and B is a parameter. Thus, in a model with only belief shocks the job nding rate follows an
AR(1) process. While the magnitude of the belief shocks, captured by B, is not pinned down
in the model, the persistence of the e¤ects of belief shocks on the job nding rate is captured
by 	; and thus endogenously determined. Persistence is maximal at 	 = 1, i.e. exactly at the
border between the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter space.
Productivity shocks: We now consider the e¤ects of technology shocks.18 In the Appendix,
we show that the model with productivity shocks can be written as:
Esbs+1 = 	bs   
As;
As = As 1 + A"As ;

  w

q
(1 !)
1  +


2R+ 

2R
:
where under conventional parameter values 
 > 0.
Consider rst the determinate case (	 > 1). We apply the method of undetermined coe¢ -
cients and guess a solution of the form bs =  As. Plugging this guess into the above system of
equations yields the following solution:
  =


	  : (30)
It can now be shown that, in the determinacy region of the parameter space, the job nding rate
responds positively to productivity shocks, i.e.   > 0. To see why, recall that the numerator of
Equation (30) is positive and note that for the denominator to be positive as well, it is required
that 	 > . In the determinacy region, this is the case since determinacy requires 	 > 1 and it
further holds that  < 1.
18For an analysis of technology shocks in the standard New Keynesian model, see Galí (1999).
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Writing out the solution for   explicitly gives:
  =
w
 1
 

1    R

+ 
q
(1 (1 !))
1  +
 
w +  1
 
1  R:
Given   > 0; it holds that
@ 
@
 0; i.e. a higher value of the market incompleteness parameter
 amplies the impact of productivity on the job nding rate. The amount of amplication,
however, depends critically on the amount of price stickiness, since @ 
@
= 0 when  = 0.
Similarly, more aggressive monetary policy dampens the response, since @ 
@
 0, but only
when prices are sticky. Real wage exibility dampens the response of the job nding rate to
productivity shocks, i.e. @ 
@
< 0, since R  1,  2 (0; 1) and @
@
< 0.
We can now solve for the ination rate, guessing a solution of the form bs =  As. Plugging
this guess into the log-linearized Euler equation gives:
  =
2R  
1    
 
1  R
1    :
It follows that ination increases following a positive technology shock (i.e.   > 0) if and only
if 2R > 
1  + 
 
1  R : Thus, unlike the response of the job nding rate, the sign of
the ination response is ambiguous. Without the incomplete markets wedge ( = 0), ination
declines following positive technology shocks, as long as either  > 0 or  > 0. The reason why
prices may increase when the incomplete markets wedge is active comes from a demand channel:
the increase in vacancy posting pushes up job nding rates, reducing the precautionary savings
motive. This creates a boom in demand which pushes up prices, which may more than o¤set
the direct e¤ect of the technology shock, which is to reduce prices by reducing costs. Finally,
note that when  =

1 +(1 R)
R
, ination does not respond to productivity shocks.
The possibility that higher productivity produces higher ination is not a mere theoretical
curiosity. In Figure 2 we show the impulse response of CPI ination to TFP shocks where
the latter correspond to those estimated by Fernald and Wang (2016). Using local projection,
we regressed (400 times) quarterly (log) changes in the CPI on TFP (log) growth (times 100)
for a sample that starts in 1980. Depending on whether one controls for movements in factor
utilization or not, higher TFP either leaves ination unchanged or gives rise to higher ination.
While the empirical results come with a fair amount of uncertainty, they do suggest that a
positive ination response is not simply an odd feature of our model.19
19The result holds also for the core PCE and here the positive response holds regardless of the TFP measure.
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Figure 2: Response of CPI ination to a positive TFP shock.
response to TFP0
0 5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
response to TFP1
0 5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Notes: IRF of 400*log(cpit/cpit-1) to change in log TFP as estimated by Fernald http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/publications/working-papers/2016/wp2016-07.pdf using local projection. The sample starts in 1980 and
we included 4 lags. TFP0 (TFP1) refers to Fernald estimate for Total Factor Productivity without (with) control
for factor utilization. Shaded areas denote error bands of two standard deviations.
Finally, consider the local responses to productivity shocks in case the model parameters
are in the indeterminacy region (	  1). This is fundamentally complicated by the fact that,
within the model, it is not pinned down to what extent fundamental shocks change beliefs.
Many di¤erent assumptions on this are possible. To understand the issue at hand, let us express
Equation (29) as: bs+1 = 	bs   
As +A"As+1 +B"Bs+1:
It is straightforward to verify that in the determinacy region (	 > 1) it holds that A =   and
B = 0. In the indeterminacy region, however, A and B are not pinned down.
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) suggest to assume that the responses to fundamental shocks do
not jumpas the parameters are pushed from the determinacy region into the indeterminacy
region. In our case, this boils down to assuming A =  : Equation (30) makes clear that under
this assumption, the response of tightness to a productivity shock may be either positive or
negative, since 	   can have either sign when 	 < 1. A singularity occurs at 	 = . Letting
	 approach  from the left, the response approaches innity. Thus, in the indeterminacy region
The results also hold true for a sample period that starts in 1984, the sample split that Fernald and Wang (2016)
focus upon.
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Figure 3: Illustration: amplication and determinacy.
0


Response of job finding rate to a positive technology shock
=
determinacy (>1)
market incompleteness ()
indeterminacy (<1)
Notes: the blue line illustrates the contamporaneous response of the job nding rate to a positive productivity
shock, as a function of the market incompleteness parameter .
amplication is possibly innitely large. Figure 3 illustrates the amplication.
5 Implications for the Zero Lower Bound
5.1 Contractionary Shocks and the ZLB
In recent years, a large literature has emerged on the e¤ects of Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) in New
Keynesian model, see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Krugman and Eggertsson
(2012) and Farhi and Werning (2013). Often, these analyses start o¤ from a premise that some
exogenous and transitory shock brings the economy to the temporarily to the ZLB. The specic
shock introduced for this purpose is typically an exogenous shock to the discount factor, making
agents temporarily more patient. The shock thus directly increases the agentswillingness to
save and drives down aggregate demand. This puts downward pressure on ination and the real
interest rate. Via the interest rate rule, this results in a decline in the nominal interest rate,
which may hit the ZLB if the shock is large enough. Arouba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2016)
estimate a NK model and nd that such discount factor shocks were responsible for taking the
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US economy to the ZLB.
The exogenous discount factor shock used in standard analyses may strike one as unsatis-
factory, leaving unexplained what created householdsincreased desire to save in the rst place.
But to appreciate the purpose of this specic shock, it helps to note that more conventional
recessionary shocks, such as negative productivity shocks, may not lead to a decline in the nom-
inal interest rate. There are two reasons for this. First, recessionary shocks reduce aggregate
income. In a representative-agent model, aggregate income moves in tandem with individual
income, and the desire to smooth consumption implies that householdsdesire to save declines
in a recession. This puts upward pressure on the real interest rate and, when prices are sticky,
also increases the nominal interest rate, see e.g. Galí (2015, Chapter 3). A negative technology
shock additionally increases costs, which puts further upward pressure on ination and, via the
Taylor rule, also the nominal interest rate. Thus, in a standard NK model without other sources
of shocks, expansionary rather than recessionary technology shocks are required to produce a
decline in the nominal interest rate. For that reason, much research in the NK literature has
introduced discount factor shocks when studying ZLB dynamics.
The precautionary savings mechanism that arises under incomplete markets can radically
alter the cyclicality of the real interest rate, avoiding the need for discount factor shocks. Me-
chanically, the incomplete-markets wedge acts as a shock to the discount factor in the Euler
equation, but is determined endogenously rather than exogenously. As economic conditions
worsen, the risk of becoming unemployed increases, driving down aggregate demand and in-
creasing agentsdesire to save. If the precautionary savings mechanism is strong enough, the
nominal interest rate declines.
To illustrate the above points more formally, consider the log-linearized interest rate rule,
for simplicity assuming that the monetary authority only responds to ination ( = 0). The
solutions derived in the previous section implies that the nominal interest rate, in log deviations
from the intended steady state, is given by bRs = bs =  As. Recall that   is negative
when  = 0: It immediately follows that under complete markets the nominal interest rate
responds positively to a negative technology shock. However, when  is su¢ ciently large,   is
positive. In that case, a negative technology shock drives down the nominal interest rate, which
hits the ZLB if the shock is large enough.
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5.2 Understanding Missing Deation
Although ination has been moderate in the aftermath of the nancial crisis, no country has
experienced persistent deation. This is not easy to reconcile with the standard NK model since
it implies deation in a liquidity trap steady state. Under the assumption of complete markets
(CM), the deterministic steady-state version Euler equation reads:
c  = 

R

CM
c 
which implies that the real interest rate is given by
 
R

CM
= 1=. It follows that when the
ZLB binds in a steady state, the gross ination rate must equal  which implies that liquidity
traps must be deationary. Temporary episodes at the ZLB will be even more deationary than
this since the stochastic Euler equation in that case will only be satised as long as  < 
during the ZLB regime.20 It is important to notice that these implications are independent of
the arguments that enter the interest rate rule.
The incomplete markets NK model has di¤erent implications. As explained earlier, the
relevant steady-state condition for the real interest rate under incomplete markets (IM) is:

R

IM
=
1

1
(1  ! (1  )) + ! (1  ) (#=w ())  <
1

;
given that # < w (), which implies that the steady-state real interest rate depends on labor
market conditions. When the ZLB binds, the steady-state Euler equation and the policy rule
for the interest rate imply that the following two conditions must be satised in a liquidity trap
(LT ):
LT = 
h 
1  !  1  LT + !  1  LT   #=w  LT  i > 
LT < 
=
R
 1=  
LT
 (=)=(1 )
Notice that if  = 0, the policy rule implies that LT < R
 1=
< 1 so that the liquidity
trap is deationary, given that in the intended steady state  =  = 1 and R = R > 1. When
20Suppose that the ZLB regime persists with probability p while the intended steady-state is absorbing. In
that case, the ination rate during the ZLB episode is determined as LT = 

p+ (1  p)  cI=cLT   where
LT is the ination rate during the liquidity trap, cI is consumption in the intended steady-state and cLT is
consumption in the liquidity trap. This condition implies LT <  as long as cI > cLT .
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 > 0, however, ination may be positive or negative in the liquidity trap. In particular, steady-
state ination is likely to be positive if
 
#=w
 
LT
   1 and wages are not too responsive
to the job nding rate, i.e. when the incomplete markets wedge is su¢ ciently strong and not
moderated strongly by wage adjustments.
5.3 Paradoxes at the Zero Lower Bound
It is well known that at the ZLB, the representative-agent NK model has some paradoxical
properties, see e.g. Eggertsson (2010), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Werning (2012).
Two paradoxes have gained special attention. The rst is a supply shock paradox: at the
ZLB, positive shocks to the supply side of the economy can be contractionary. The second is
a paradox of exibility, and is associated to the nding that, at the ZLB, a higher degree of
price exibility creates a larger drop in output.21
The exibility paradox originates from the fact that at the ZLB, rms are cutting prices, i.e.
ination is negative. The lower price adjustment costs, the more willing rms are to cut prices
and hence the lower is the rate of ination. The supply shock paradox arises from the fact that
a positive supply shock pushes down production costs and hence ination.
The paradoxical e¤ects of a decline in expected ination can be understood from the con-
sumption Euler equation. Consider, for simplicity, the complete-markets Euler equation under
perfect foresight at the ZLB: 
cs+1
cs

= 
1
s+1
The e¤ect of a decline in expected ination, at the ZLB, is that the real interest rate, 1
s+1
,
increases. The above Euler equation makes clear that this implies an increase in expected
consumption growth, cs+1=cs. Given that the decline in ination is transitory however, an
increase in expected consumption growth implies a decline in the current level of consumption,
i.e. an economic contraction.
The joint presence of incomplete markets and search and matching frictions, however, can
mitigate or even overturn these results. Mechanically, the endogenous incomplete-markets wedge
in the Euler equation can absorb the e¤ect of a decline in the real interest rate. Intuitively, an
increase in output implies an increase in hiring, which reduces the precautionary savings motive.
The reduced desire to save makes an expansion in output compatible with an increase in the
21Throughout this subsection, we consider equilibria which ultimately lead to the intended steady state. Prop-
erties of equilibria leading to the liquidity trap steady state can be very di¤erent, see e.g. Mertens and Ravn
(2014).
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real interest rate.
We now formalize these arguments. Suppose that the economy uctuates discretely between
a depressed state at which the ZLB binds, and a normal statewhich coincides with the
intended steady state. Let p be the probability that the ZLB regime persists and let the normal
state be absorbing. In the appendix we show that in this setting, the elasticity of the job nding
rate with respect to expected ination, at the ZLB, is given by
dbZLBs
dEsbZLBs+1 = 1  1  Rp  Rp:
Under complete markets ( = 0), the elasticity is positive since  > 0 and Rp < 1: Thus,
any additional shock which reduces expected ination creates a labor market contraction. As
explained above, this is the source of the two paradoxes. However, when  > 
p
( 1R
 1   p),
i.e. when markets are su¢ ciently incomplete, the elasticity is negative. In that case, a reduction
in expected ination creates a labor market expansion.
6 Pricing Risky Assets
This section explores asset pricing implications of the model. We show that the model generates
a positive risk premium, but only if markets are incomplete. Intuitively, agents dislike asset
with returns that co-move negatively with the probability of becoming unemployed, and hence
require a discount relative to asset with acyclical returns.
For simplicity, consider the model with sticky wages ( = 0) and no sunspots. We focus
on equilibria around the intended steady state. The stochastic discount factor of an employed
household is given by e;s;s+1 = !
 
1  s+1

(#=w)  + 
 
1  !  1  s+1. Note that the
period-s conditional correlation between s;s+1 and s+1 (and hence between s;s+1 and As+1)
is perfectly negative, due to the fact that # < w. The appendix shows that the conditional
variance of the stochastic discount factor is given by:
V ars fe;s;s+1g = 22 22A:
Note that under complete markets ( = 0), we obtain V ars fe;s;s+1g = 0; i.e. the stochastic dis-
count factor is constant. Intuitively, when agentsincome is fully insured against unemployment
risk and wages are sticky, their income, and hence their desire to save, is completely constant.
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When markets are incomplete, the precautionary savings motive emerges and uctuates with
the cycle since the amount of unemployment risk varies over the business cycle.
Exogenous payo¤s: We now use the model to price risky assets with simple payo¤ structures.
First, consider a risky asset that pays o¤ 1 +As+1   As in period s+ 1. We choose this payo¤
structure as it has the simplifying property that the expected payo¤ is one, while at the same
time payo¤s increase after an expansionary shock to productivity.
To obtain analytical tractability, we again assume that the asset is in zero net supply and
that households cannot go short in the asset. As a result, the employed asset-poor households
are the ones pricing the asset at the margin, whereas the other two types of households are
in equilibrium at the no-short sale constraint. Krusell, Smith and Mukoyama (2011) exploit a
similar setup to price risky asset under incomplete markets, but in an economy with exogenous
endowments. Here, we analyze the importance of the endogenous feedback mechanism created
by HANK and SAM, and study the e¤ects of monetary policy on asset prices.
In the appendix, we show that the employed householdsstochastic discount factor and the
solution of the log-linearized model imply that the price of the risky asset, denoted zs, is given
by:
zs = Ese;s;s+1    2A:
In the above equation, the term  2A is the discount relative to a risky asset. To see this,
consider a riskless asset that pays out one unit of goods in the next period regardless of the
state of the world (i.e. a real bond). Again imposing the no-shortsale constraint, it follows
immediately from the householdsdiscount factor that the price of the riskless asset is given by
Ese;s;s+1:
The above equation thus makes clear that if markets are incomplete, i.e.  > 0, there
is a risk premium, which emerges despite the fact that the above equation is based on the
solution of the log-linearized model.22 Further, recall that   is the response of the job nding
rate to a productivity shock. The magnitude of   depends on the strength of the endogenous
interaction between HANK and SAM, as well as on the monetary policy rule. By responding
more aggressively to economic shocks, the central bank stabilizes the economy, reducing the
strength of the precautionary savings mechanism and thereby the risk premium. Finally, note
that without shocks, i.e. A = 0, there is no risk premium.
22In representative agent models risk premia typically vanish after log-linearization since in the steady state
there is no risk. Recall that in our model, by contrast, there is still idiosyncratic risk in the steady state.
30
Endogenous payo¤s: Consider now another risky asset with an payo¤ equal to 1+bs+1 bs.
Note that, again, the expected payo¤ is one and that the payo¤ is increasing in next periods
job nding rate. Again, we impose the no-shortsale constraint. The appendix shows that price
of the asset is given by:
zs = Ese;s;s+1    22A
Note that in the return of the risky asset we now observe  2 rather than  . This reects the
fact that the payo¤ of the asset is now endogenous. As a result, market frictions and monetary
policy a¤ect the risk premium via two channels: through he households stochastic discount
factor (via their unemployment risk) and through the asset payo¤ (via the equilibrium e¤ects of
household demand).
7 An Empirical Perspective
In this nal section we propose a simple way of confronting the model with the data. Using the
log-linearized Euler equation, we can obtain the following expression for the real interest rate,
bRrs = (1  )   + (+) Rbs
where bRrs  bRs Esbs+1. The above equation provides a direct relation between market tightness
and the real interest rate, which we can confront with the data.
Note that under complete markets ( = 0) we obtain d
bRrs
dbs = (1  ) (  1) < 0: Thus,
the complete markets model predicts that in a recession, when the labor market is less tight,
the real interest rate increases. Intuitively, a transitory decline in income motivates households
to borrow, pushing up the equilibrium real interest rate.
When  is su¢ ciently high, however, the relation between the real interest rate and market
tightness is positive. Under incomplete markets, low labor market tightness strengthens the
precautionary savings motive and hence pushes down the equilibrium real interest rate. Figure
4 presents the relation between the two variables over the period since Paul Volcker left the
Federal Reserve. Data are expressed in percentage deviations from a linear trend, estimated
over the period up to the end of 2007. The two series display a striking positive correlation, with
a coe¢ cient of 0.84. During all three recessions, indicated by shaded areas, the two variables
jointly decline. Thus, the data appear to strongly favor the incomplete-markets model over its
complete-markets counterpart.
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Figure 4: Real interest rate (Rr) and labor market tightness (v=u) in the data.
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Notes: Real interest rate and labor market tightness (vacancy-unemployment ratio) in the United States; devi-
ations from trend. The real interest rate is expressed on a monthly basis and is computed as the Federal Funds
rate minus a six-month moiving average of CPI ination. Vacancies are measured as the composite Help Wanted
index from Barnichon (2010). Data series were logged and de-trended using a linear trend estimated over the
period up to the end of 2007.
The data can also be used to directly parameterize  and get a sense of the quantitative im-
portance of the key mechanism in the model. For simplicity, consider a model with sticky wages
( = 0). The log-linearized Euler equation implies that the ration of unconditional variances of
the two variables are given by V ar(
bRrs)
V ar(bs) = (1  )222R22: Suppose for example that  = 12 ,
 = 0:99 and R = 1:23 Given the ratio of variances observed in the data, this implies that
 = 0:0061: To facilitate interpretation of this number, Figure 4 plots for a range of assump-
tions on the coe¢ cient of risk aversion ; the implied consumption loss upon unemployment
(#=w). For example, for a coe¢ cient of risk aversion of 2, the calculation implies a consumption
loss of about 15 percent, which seems reasonable in the light of empirical evidence.
23Under incomplete markets it typically holds that R < 1. Even then, however, the number tends to be close
to one, and lowering it has very limited e¤ects on the results.
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Figure 5: Consumption loss upon unemployment.
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8 Conclusion
We have proposed a simple and intuitive heterogeneous-agents New Keynesian (NK) model with
endogenous unemployment, and highlighted that the interaction between market frictions can
give rise to belief-driven uctuations. Moreover, the interaction between these frictions produces
potentially a signicant amount of amplication of shocks to the economy. The essence of the
interaction is that incomplete markets produces movements in aggregate demand in response
to uctuations in the job nding rate which impact on the supply side when there are nominal
rigidities and creates a feedback mechanism. In particular, weak labor demand produces low
goods demand which in itself produces low labor demand. The combination of HANK and SAM
therefore has fundamental consequences and puts labor markets in the centre of the amplication
and transmission mechanism.
We have also shown that the new NK model can resolve a large number of puzzles that have
arisen in the macroeconomic literature. These involve the existence of persistent low growth
equilibria with low but positive ination, the impact of supply shocks on ination dynamics, and
various paradoxes at the ZLB. Intriguingly, the model can also provide a coherent framework for
understanding the positive relationship between real interest rates and labor market tightness
which can be observed in the US.
We have demonstrated that under incomplete markets the NK model becomes useful to
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analyze the link between monetary policy and nancial asset prices. While we have limited the
analysis to simple analytical exercises, it would be interesting to evaluate the extent to which
a full-scale heterogeneous-agents NK can explain observed asset prices. Vice versa, nancial
markets data may be useful to impose empirical discipline on the new generation of NK models.
Throughout the analysis, we have assumed that government policies are summarized by a
simple interest rate rule, subject to the zero lower bound. It would be interesting to think use
the framework to obtain insights into the stabilization e¤ects of other government policies, such
as scal policy or labor market policies. Also, the framework could be used to consider optimal
policies. We leave these issues for future research.
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Appendix
Steady-state Nash bargaining solution
The steady-state expressions of the asset-poor householdssurplus and value functions are:
V e (1   (1  ! (1  ))) = w
1 
1      + ! (1  )V
u;
V u (1   (1  )) = #
1 
1   + V
e;
where we have exploited that in equilibrium the asset-poor households are the same and consume
their incomes. Now substitute out V u in the rst equation:
V e (1   (1  ! (1  ))) = w
1 
1      +
! (1  )
1   (1  )

#1 
1   + V
e

:
V e

1   (1  ! (1  ))  ! (1  )
1   (1  )

=
w1 
1      +
! (1  )
1   (1  )
#1 
1  ;
We can now express the two values as functions of  and w:
V e (; w) =
w1 
1     + !(1 )1 (1 ) #
1 
1 
1   (1  ! (1  ))  !(1 )
1 (1 )
V u (; w) =
#1 
1  + V
e (; w)
1   (1  )
The rst-order condition to the Nash Bargaining problem is given by
(1  )Se = Sf ;
or,
(1  ) (V e (; w)  V u (; w)) = =(1 ):
(V e (; w)  V u (; w)) = 
1  
The above is an equation in two variables, which implicitly denes the wage as a function of the
job nding rate, i.e the function w():
Basic properties: Consider the special case in which  = 0. From the Nash bargaining
solution it follows that the wage must satisfy V e (0; w(0)) = V u (0; w(0)) =
#1 
1 
1  : It follows that
w(0)1 
1  =
#1 
1  +  and hence w(0) > # whenever  > 0:
At the other extreme, under  = 1 we get from the Nash Bargaining solution V e (1; w) =
V u (1; w)+ 
1  . Also, the worker value functions imply that V
e (1; w) V u (1; w) = w(1)1 
1    
#1 
1  : It follows that
w(1)1 
1  =
#1 
1  ++

1  and hence w(1) > w(0); V
e (1; w(1)) > V e (0; w(0))
and V u (1; w) > V u (0; w) :
Finally, consider a case in which the worker has no bargaining power ( = 0). It follows
from the Nash bargaining solution that in this case V e (; w) = V u (; w) which implies that
w()1 
1  =
#1 
1  + . As a result, the real wage does not depend of , i.e. the real wage is sticky.
Log-linearizing the model
Nash Bargaining block
The rst-order condition to the Nash bargaining problem, together with the asset-poor workers
value functions are given by:
(1  ) (V es   V us ) = =(1 )s ;
V es =
w1 s
1      + Es!
 
1  s+1

V us+1 + Es
 
1  !  1  s+1V es+1;
V us =
#1 
1   + Es
 
1  s+1

V us+1 + Ess+1V es+1:
After log-linearization, the above system can be written in the following form:
A
2664
bV esbV usbws
3775+Bbs = EsC
2664
bV es+1bV us+1bws+1
3775+ EsDbs+1
where A and C are 3  3 matrices and B and D are 3  1 vectors, all consisting of parameter
values. Note that none of the variables bV es , bV us and bws is a state variable. Provided that bs
follows some linear law of motion and given the law of motion for As, we can apply the method
of undetermined coe¢ cients to nd solutions for bV es , bV us and bws as linear functions of bs. We
denote the solution for the wage as bws = bs, where it follows that  is a function of the
parameters that enter A, B, C and D.
Monetary Policy rule, Euler equation, Phillips Curve
The log-linerarized monetary policy rule is given by:
bRs = bs + bs:
Next, consider the Euler equation of the employed households. Exploiting the fact that in
Equilibrium ce;s = ws and cu;s = #; we can express the employed workers Euler equation,
Equation (20), as:
w s = Es
Rs
s+1
 
!
 
1  s+1

#  +
 
1  !  1  s+1w s+1
and note that in the intended steady state we obtainw  = R
 
! (1  )#  + (1  ! (1  ))w  :
Log-linearizing the above equation around the intended steady state gives:
  bws = bRs   Esbs+1   R! (#=w)  Esbs+1 + R!Esbs+1   R (1  ! (1  ))Es bws+1
=  REs bws+1 + bRs   Esbs+1   R!  (#=w)    1Esbs+1 + R! (1  )Es bws+1
=  REs bws+1 + bRs   Esbs+1   REsbs+1
where  = !
 
(#=w)    1  ! (1  ). Exploiting that bws = bs gives:
 bs = bRs   Esbs+1   R ( + )Esbs+1:
Next, consider the rmsprice setting condition, which can be written as:
 (s   1)s   Ess;s+1ys+1
ys
(s+1   1)s+1
= 1   + 

ws + 
=(1 )
s   (1  !)Ess;s+1=(1 )s+1 + v;s

:
and note that at the intended steady state v;s = 0 and s;s+1 = . Log-linearizing the equation
around the intended steady state with  = 1 gives:


bs   

Esbs+1 = wbs   wAs + q


1  bs    (1  !)1   bs+1    (1  !) bs;s+1

where we have substituted out the wage using bws = bs.
Reducing the model
Under the the two assumptions ( = 1 and risk-neutrality of the equity investors) and in the
absence of productivity shocks, the log-linearized Euler equation and pricing condition become:
 bs + 2REsbs+1 = bs   Esbs+1 + 1  bs   2REsbs+1
wbs + q


1  bs    (1  !)1   Esbs+1

=


bs   Esbs+1
where in the rst equation we have substituted out the interest rate using bRs = bs+bs, and
tightness using bs = bs1  . Using the rst equation to substitute out bs  Esbs+1 in the second
equation gives:
wbs+q


1  bs    (1  !)1   Esbs+1

=



 bs + 2REsbs+1   1  bs + 2REsbs+1

:
Collecting terms gives:
Esbs+1 = 	bs;
where
	 =


 + 


1  + w+

q

1 

q
(1 !)
1  +


2R+ 

2R
:
Adding productivity shocks
With productivity shocks the model becomes:
wbs   wAs + q


1  bs    (1  !)1   Esbs+1

=



 bs + 2REsbs+1   1  bs + 2REsbs+1

;
As = As 1 + A"As ;
which we can rewrite as
Esbs+1 = 	bs   
As;
As = As 1 + A"As ;
where

 =
w

q
(1 !)
1  +


2R+ 

2R
:
The Euler equation at the ZLB
Consider the setup described in Section 5.3. At the ZLB, it holds, for x = f;g, that Esxs+1 =
pEsxZLBs+1 + (1  p)x, where x is the level at the indended steady state. Log-linearization of this
equation around the intended steady state gives Esbxs+1 = pxZLBs+1 : Note further that at the ZLB,
Rs = 1 and hence hence bRs =   lnR:
Plugging these results into the Euler equation, log-linearized around the steady state and as
derived above, gives:
 

 
1  Rp  RpbZLBs = lnR + EsbZLBs+1 :
where we have used that, conditional on staying at the ZLB, it holds that EsbZLBs+1 = pEsbZLBs .
After di¤erentiation, we obtain
dbZLBs
dEsbZLBs+1 = 1  1  Rp  Rp:
Pricing risk assets
Consider the stochastic discount factor of the employed, asset-poor households:
e;s;s+1 = !
 
1  s+1

(#=w)  + 
 
1  !  1  s+1
Given the solution, the job nding rate is up to a rst-order approximationgiven by s =
+ As:We exploit this to write the period s conditional expectation and variance of e;s;s+1,
respectively, as:
Ese;s;s+1 = !
 
1  Ess+1

(#=w)  + 
 
1  !  1  Ess+1
= ! (1      As) (#=w)  +  (1  ! (1      As))
and
V ars fe;s;s+1g = 2!2
 
1  (#=w) 2 V ars s+1	 ;
= 2!2
 
1  (#=w) 2 2 2V ars As + A"As+1	 ;
= 2!2
 
1  (#=w) 2 2 22A
= 22 2
2
A
Exogenous payo¤s: The pricing equation for the asset that pays o¤ 1 +As+1   As in period
s+ 1 reads:
zs = Es fe;s;s+1 (1 + As+1   As)g
= Ese;s;s+1Es (1 + As+1   As) + Covt(e;s;s+1; 1 + As+1   As)
= Ese;s;s+1  
q
V ars fe;s;s+1gV ars f1 + As+1   Asg
= Ese;s;s+1    2A
where we exploited the fact that the Cors fs;s+1; As+1g =  1, that 1 + EsAs+1   As = 1, and
that V ars f1 + As+1   Asg = 2A:
Endogenous payo¤s: Consider now another risky asset with an payo¤ equal to 1+bs+1 bs.
The pricing equation for this asset reads:
zs = Es

e;s;s+1
 
1 + bs+1   bs	
= Es fe;s;s+1 (1 +  As+1    As)g
= Ese;s;s+1  
q
V ars fe;s;s+1gV ars f1 +  As+1    Asg
= Ese;s;s+1    22A
Risk-averse investors
When we log-linearized the model, we have assumed for simplicity that the asset-rich rm owners
are risk neutral. The reason is that, technically, the unemployment rate becomes a state variable
for ination and the job nding rate, once we assume risk averse investors. With an additional
state variable, the analytical solution of the model becomes more cumbersome, detracting from
the key intuitions of the model.
Below, we use numerical simulations to compare versions with risk-neutral and risk-averse
investors, showing only very small di¤erences. We parametrize the model as follows. We choose
the subjective discount factor  target a steady-state interest rate of 3 percent per annum.
The coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , is set to 2; whereas the elasticity of substitution between
goods, , is set to 6: To calibrate the price-stickiness parameter , we exploit the observational
equivalence between the Calvo and Rotemberg versions of the log-linearized New Keynesian
model, and target an average price duration of 5 months. The home production parameter, #,
is set to imply a 15 percent consumption drop upon unemployment.
The vacancy cost is parametrized to target a stead-state hiring cost of about 4 percent of the
quarterly wage, following Silva and Toledo (2009). We further target a monthly job nding rate
of 0:3 and set the job loss rate, !, to 2 percent. The matching function elasticity parameter, ,
is set to 0:5. Regarding the monetary policy rule, we set  = 1:5 and  = 0. The persistence
parameter of the technology shock is set to  = 0:95: For simplicity we assume sticky wages
( = 0).
The left panel of the gure below (incomplete markets) plots the response of the job nding
rate to a positive technology shock. On impact, the response is larger with risk-averse investors.
In subsequent periods, the pattern reverses and the response is smaller with risk-averse investors.
Quantitatively, however, the di¤erences are very small.
Next, we consider a version of the model in which we set the home production parameter #
such that there is no consumption loss upon job loss. E¤ectively, this removes the incomplete-
markets wedge from the model. The right panel of the gure below (complete markets) again
compares the versions with risk-averse and risk-neutral investors. The di¤erences are similar to
the complete markets case. Most importantly, di¤erens are again very small.
Figure 6: Responses to a positive technology shock.
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